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The Identity of Persons and Turing Machines
1 Introduction
A fundamental question in computer research is whether a person is a com-
putable entity, i.e. whether the time dependent relation which connects various
states of a person (personal identity) is in principle Turing computable.
Seeking to reject this idea, I shall in §2 characterise three notions: personal
identity, deductive Turing machines, and information theory. In §4 I shall detail
how personal identity can be seen as information transmission and thereby serve
as the input to a Turing machine. In §5 I shall interpret non-branching accounts
of personal identity in light of information transmission and show them decid-
able. In §6 I shall argue that non-branching accounts are inferior to branching
accounts due to transitivity issues. In §7 I shall interpret branching accounts of
personal identity in light of information transmission and show them undecid-
able. I shall thus conclude that if the identity of persons is branching, then it
cannot be decidedly computed by deductive Turing machines.
2 Background
2.1 Motivation
Present endeavours in artificial intelligence are progressing towards approximat-
ing human intelligence. ‘Classical logic architectures’ have been superseded by
connectionist networks (neural models constituted by multiple connected and
weighted units) that are challenging human performance in areas like vision1,
language production2, and domain specific judgement3. Regardless, AI algo-
rithms are built in consistent axiomatic systems which are subject to Turing
computability. Whereas narrow AI has been the focus of contemporary research,
the ultimate goal for artificial agents lies in artificial general intelligence, i.e.
fully modeling the human persona by artificial means. This endeavour evokes
the question whether the person itself is in principle a Turing computable ob-
ject or whether it holds a more privileged metaphysical status.4 Whilst initially
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cognitive science where both connectionist5 and dynamical systems6 approaches
have been deployed toward a computational theory of mind. More practically,
development in the intersection between computer science and neuroscience has
stood to pioneer scientific endeavours to support these ends.7 By this I shall
investigate a novel intersection between the identity of persons and theoreti-
cal computer science to answer whether personal identity is in principle Turing
computable, i.e. a computable relation waiting to be quantised and replicated
by artificial means.
Before answering this question, I shall provide an analysis of personal iden-
tity in terms of information theory to sharpen its definition for serving as the
input to a Turing machine. The original question then enquires whether a
Turing machine computing personal identity will terminate in finite time, i.e.
whether personal identity is decidable. If positive, this would entail that the
identity of persons is a computable object.
2.2 Personal identity and continuity
Take three initial conditions to constitute personal identity:
• Identity : x = y iff, ∀P (Px↔ Py).
• Personhood : the persistence properties P under which a person x at t and
t+ 1 is the same person.
• Personal identity : xt = xt+1 iff, ∀Pxt∀Pxt+1(Pxt ↔ Pxt+1).
From this I take personal identity as a map of properties projected between
one state of a person, xt, to another, xt+1, m : Pxt → Pxt+1.
There are broadly two routes to describe what these necessary and sufficient
properties of persons are:
1. Psychology : Ps are psychological properties.8
2. Biology : Ps are biological properties.9
For the purposes of this essay I shall follow (1): personal identity as psycho-
logical continuity, since it remains the dominant view in the literature. 10
My argument turns on a divide between psychological continuity accounts:
branching and non-branching. Branching is the idea that the timeline (branch)
a person exists on whilst being identical to themselves can split into multi-
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accounts want to honour this picture and generally stipulate a secondary re-
lation (survival) which ensures the person persists on the new sub-branches.11
Non-branching accounts deny such branching and instead aim to reinterpret or
constrain one of the personal identity conditions.12
2.3 Turing machines and decidability
Let us define some primaries of Turing machines.13 I shall assume Turing’s
initial definition of them as deductive Turing machines.
Starting with functions:
Partial Recursive Functions: The partial recursive functions are
those that can be defined from the basic functions14 by a chain of
operators.15
These underpin the Turing-computable functions. Turing computation is
defined as follows. Start with an arbitrarily long line of ‘cells’ which can contain
either of two values (0, 1), or else is blank. Imagine a machine capable of
perceiving one cell at a time. At any cell the machine has a five membered
action space:
• 0: Write a 0.
• 1: Write a 1.
• B: Write a blank.
• L: Move one step to the left.
• R: Move one step to the right.
Define an instruction-quadruple (i-quadruple) to be an ordered quadruple
< q1, S,A, q2 >, whose elements are:
1. q1: a non-zero number.
2. S: the contents of the scanned cell (0, 1, blank).
3. A: the action space (0, 1, B, l, R).
4. q2: a number indicating the next instruction to execute.
For example, we can imagine the i-quadruple at q1 as stating: if the scanned
cell contains S, perform the action indicated by A, then go to the instructions
with label q2; if q2 is 0, then halt the execution of the program.
By this characterisation we can establish two central tenets:
11Parfit 1986, 200
12Lewis 1976, 20
13For more extensive definitions see P. Smith 2013, 310
14Successor: S(N) = N + 1; Zero: Z(N) = 0; Identity Iki (x1, ..., xk) = xi.
15Composition: f(x) = g(h(x), j(x)); Primitive recursion: f(x, 0) = g(x) → f(x, Sy) =
h(x, y, f(x, y)); Minimisation: f(x) = µy[g(x, y) = 0].
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1. Turing computability : A Turing program is a finite consistent set of i-
quadruples, and a function is Turing-computable iff there is a Turing pro-
gram that computes it.
2. Decidability : A property/relation is decidable iff there is an algorithmic
procedure that a suitable Turing machine could use to decide, in a finite
number of steps, whether the property/relation applies to any appropriate
given item(s).
2.4 Information
To enable the Turing computation of personal identity, we can use definitions
from theories of information. Information is a general concept which denotes
any amount of data in any medium. I shall define information operationally
using an adapted formulation of Shannon’s work.16
Take a communication channel between a signaler S and a receiver R. A Bit
of information B passed from S to R will be disordered during transmission in
proportion to the noise in the channel. If there is no noise, then B would fully
resolve. If there is sufficient noise to completely block B, then no information
resolves. Successful information transmission in a channel therefore abides by a
probability distribution p(B), where 0 ≤ p(B) ≤ 1.
So, assume the Information Definition to be a 3-tuple (S,R,B):
• S (signaler): an entity which transmits information.
• R (receiver): an entity which receives information.
• B (information): a piece of information measured in bits.
To compute transmission of information in a system which has a memory
and evolves in time, such as a person, the formalism for dynamical systems
can be used.17 A dynamical system is a model which computes the probability
distribution of a set of points evolving in time. For our purposes simply note
five definitions of such systems:
• System: a set under consideration.
• Constants: members of the set.
• State (|ψ〉): a configuration of a system with the requirement that the
probabilities of all sub-systems (containing constants) add up to 1.
• Density matrix (ρψi): a record of the system’s evolution through time
which yields a probability distribution.





Each possible configuration of the system is characterised by a state. When
a computation is performed on the system, the density matrix keeps track of
all possible states and yields predictions about the system’s future according to
a probability calculus derived from the states. The calculation of the density
matrix thus determines whether the system is decidable.
3 Argument statement
In essence, personal identity is psychological continuity where psychological
properties persist through time. Turing machines are deterministic algorithms
which halt in finite time, i.e. are Turing computable/decidable. We seek to an-
swer whether personal identity is in principle Turing computable. I shall argue
negatively as follows:
1. Turing machines can only compute decidable systems.
2. Personal identity can be seen as an information system.
3. By (2), non-branching accounts of personal identity are decidable.
4. By (2), branching accounts of personal identity are undecidable.
5. Branching accounts of personal identity are superior to non-branching.
6. ∴ Turing machines cannot compute personal identity.
(1) is an established fact.18 I shall argue for (2) by drawing on Benthem’s
account of persons as information transmission systems.19 I shall argue for
(3) by detailing how Locke’s account results in a dynamical system which is
decidable.20 I shall argue for (4) by detailing how Parfit’s account results in a
dynamical system which is undecidable.21 By highlighting the insufficiency of
non-branching accounts contra branching ones, I shall establish (5). This will
lead me to conclusion (6) that personal identity is not Turing computable.
4 Priming personal identity for computation
To bridge the gap between the informal concept of personal identity, and the
formal definition of Turing machines, we need to make the definition of personal
identity more precise. Towards this end I shall establish two claims:
Claim 1 : Psychological continuity can be seen as information trans-
mission.





Claim 2 : Psychological continuity can be modeled by dynamical
systems.
Let us take each claim in turn.
4.1 Claim 1
4.1.1 Persons and information transmission
Following classical interpretations of cognition as computation in cognitive sci-
ence,22 we can support Benthem’s23 characterisation of the evolution of a per-
son’s psychological properties (knowledge, beliefs, and general mental states) as
information transmission.
Benthem analyses the continuous process and mutual influence of action and
memory formation as information transmission. He assumes it as a three-stage
process: (i) gathering, (ii) storage, and (iii) inference.
Consider an example: a person x decides to put on Chanel No. 5 rather
than Miss Dior. The situation is modeled as: C ∨ D,¬D ∴ C. The transmis-
sion of information can be understood as: (i) x has gathered information from
communication and observation about Chanel No. 5 and Miss Dior; (ii) once
sufficient information has been accumulated in storage, (iii) x infers a judge-
ment and commits to an action – in this case choosing Chanel No. 5. So, x has
progressed through a cycle of information transmission.
Benthem analogises this information transmission to computation. A per-
son’s memory is an information state. When the person interacts with their
environment they are exposed to information-producing events. These events
transition the person from one information state to another. So, we can define
information transmission as transitions between information states.
Take the example again. The information states are sets of options at any
stage, i.e. {Chanel No. 5, Miss Dior}. Each option has a probability of being
chosen which is determined by previous states stored in memory – in this case
assume [0.5, 0.5]. Successive update actions on these states are then triggered
by information inputs to x. This reduces the uncertainty of the options and
eventually leads to an action, i.e. from [0.5, 0.5] to [1, 0]. The outcome of this
action produces new information that is stored in memory, and the cycle repeats.
So, new information changes the information state, and the information state
informs action which becomes new information.
4.1.2 Personal identity and information definition
We can map Benthem’s characterisation onto the case for personal identity.
Analysing psychological properties as information states makes the persistence
of psychological properties fit the Information Definition:




• R (receiver): x at a future time t+ 1
• B (information): psychological property P, i.e. a memory.
For illustration, consider the following. A person x ’s memory P is preserved
between two of x ’s information states: Pxt → Pxt+1. The memory is of x ’s
first date with y where x wore Chanel No. 5. If xt+1 remembers the meeting
(p(P ) = 1), then xt+1 6= x. If xt+1 forgets the meeting (p(P ) < 1), then
xt+1 6= x.
I shall take this characterisation to capture how information transmission
can serve as a formal analysis of personal identity. So, by support of Benthem’s
work I determine Claim 1 fulfilled.
4.2 Claim 2
The benefit of this information theoretic interpretation is that it allows import-
ing formalism used to measure information transmission, i.e. dynamical sys-
tems, and deploy it towards personal identity. This in turn allows an analysis
of decidability.
A dynamical system can model personal identity as follows:
• System: a person.
• Constants: all possible memories of the person.
• State (|ψ〉): one configuration of the person’s memories.
• Density matrix (ρψi): a record of all possible states the person’s evolution
can assume.
• Dimensionality: the number of possible timelines the person can evolve
according to.
According to Benthem’s analysis, the crucial feature of personal identity is
the time-dependent conditional probability of a person forming a new memory
based on past memories. This is characterised and computed by the density
matrix. The dimensionality of the system scales according to the number of
timelines under consideration. By these notions dynamical systems formalism
can be used to model personal identity. When a system so applied is decidable,
a Turing machine can compute it.
By this I determine Claim 2 fulfilled. This establishes an information the-
oretic interpretation of personal identity. So analysed, personal identity can in
principle serve as the input to a Turing machine. I shall now turn to analyse
how differing conceptions of personal identity result in decidable and undecid-
able systems.
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5 Computing non-branching personal identity
Non-branching accounts of personal identity result in decidable systems. I shall
argue as follows:
(a) Non-branching personal identity should be modeled as a 1-dimensional
dynamical system.
(b) 1-dimensional dynamical systems are decidable.
(c) ∴ Non-branching personal identity is decidable.
Let us take each premise in turn.
5.1 Non-branching and 1-dimensional dynamical systems
Non-branching psychological continuity applies a 1-dimensional analysis of the
persistence of temporal parts. Whilst many different forms of non-branching
continuity exists,24 we can follow Reid’s interpretation25 of Locke as a paradigm
example.26 Locke can be seen as a straightforward memory theorist: psycholog-
ical continuity is a linear continuity of memory. So interpreted, every time-slice
is a sequential event with a single degree of freedom: between two information
states of x, either x persists as xt+1 or x does not, there is no alternate timeline.
Psychological continuity can thereby be modeled by 1-dimensional dynamical
systems.
Consider an illustrative example. At some time t, x went on a date with y
wearing Chanel No. 5. At some future time t + 1, x can be in either one of
two states: (i) x remembers the date, then xt = xt+1; (ii) x does not remember
the date, then xt 6= xt+1. This can be expressed as a tuple {remember, ¬
remember}. Assume the two states to initially have equal probability (ρψi):
[0.5, 0.5]. Successive update actions on x between t and t + 1 then determine
the result of the final outcome. For example, assume it to converge towards
[1, 0]. In this case xt = xt+1.
In sum, Locke’s account sees personal identity as a linear relation. Whilst
each successive information state xt, xt+1, xt+2, ..., xt+n, remembers the previous
states, x ’s personal identity is preserved. By this characterisation non-branching
accounts can serve as inputs to a Turing machine. I take this to establish premise
a.
5.2 1-dimensional dynamical systems are decidable
Moving to premise b we see that personal identity, as established by premise
a, is decidable. 1-dimensional dynamical systems are decidable since ‘point-to-
point reachability’ can be proved decidable in them. The decidabiliy problem
24Demarest 2015
25Reid 1785 (1969), III.6
26Locke 1694 (1975), II.27.9
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was initially posed as the ‘Orbit Problem’ for linear sequential machines by
Harrison.27 It was subsequently shown decidable in polynomial time by Kannan
and Lipton.28 So, if personal identity is a 1-dimensional dynamical system, then
it is Turing computable.
In sum, by defining personal identity as information transmission we can
analyse personal identity by dynamical systems formalism. Such formalism
can serve as the input to Turing machines. Glossing personal identity as non-
branching, it can be modeled as a 1-dimensional dynamical system. These
systems are decidable. So non-branching personal identity is decidable, which
establishes conclusion c.
6 1-dimensional or n-dimensional personal iden-
tity
However, non-branching accounts encounter problems concerning transitivity
which contradict the intuition of personal identity.
Take a person x at time t with a memory A. The same x at t+ 1 might still
remember A, so xt = xt+1. Additionally, xt+1 also has a memory B. However,
x at t+ 2 might not remember A, so xt+2 6= xt, but xt+2 does remember B, so
xt+2 = xt+1. This means that transitivity is broken, but x plausibly remains
the same person.
Whilst various attempts have been made to save non-branching accounts,29
the issue seems to either persist30 or prompt a revision of tense which threatens
to forfeit straightforward non-branching.31
To overcome these difficulties, Parfit has provided a distinction between two
notions: identity and survival.32 These lead to two relations:
• Psychological connectedness: an intransitive relation which requires the
holding of direct psychological relations.
• Psychological continuity : a transitive relation which requires overlapping
chains of direct psychological relations.
Parfit then terms that only connectedness is necessary for survival, whereas
continuity is necessary for identity. He accepts that the two can come apart
and notes that only survival, i.e. connectedness, is important. This entails that
transitivity is not necessary for a person to survive. For example, if xt+2 does
not remember A, then xt+2 6= xt, but x still survives as xt+2. This resolves
transitivity issues and preserves psychological continuity.
27Harrison 1969
28Lipton 1986





However, Parfit’s interpretation applies branching which has a consequence
for dynamical systems. If continuity is broken a person branches onto a sub-
branch of themselves, i.e. a different possibility of themselves. To illustrate
Parfit describes a fission case as an additional problem for non-branching views.33
A person x is split in two: x1 and x2. x is not identical to either x1 or x2, and
x1 6= x2 since they constitute independent persons. However, due to branching
x is said to survive as both: x ’s timeline has branched into two sub-branches
which ensure x stays connected to both x1 and x2. So, when two time-slices of
a person exist on the same branch they are both connected and continuous, but
when time-slices branch off they merely remain connected. For non-branching
accounts this constitutes a fundamental problem: the person must cease to exist
since only one continuous branch constitutes their being. However, branching
accounts solve the tension by connectedness.
This entails that the dynamical system which models branching personal
identity, or survival, has to be sufficiently robust to compute a person’s total
space of branches. However, since we take branches as the degrees of freedom
for our system, 1-dimensional systems are not sufficient for this task. They can
only model a single branch at all times. If two or more branches are the case,
then the system fails. So the dynamical system must scale to n-dimensions to
accommodate n number of branches.
7 Computing branching personal identity
n-dimensional dynamical systems exist in various forms which are either de-
cidable or undecidable. However, I shall argue that any system which models
branching personal identity must be chaotic. Any chaotic n-dimensional dy-
namical system is undecidable. So, branching personal identity is undecidable.
I shall argue as follows:
(d) Branching personal identity should be modeled as a chaotic n-dimensional
dynamical system.
(e) Chaotic n-dimensional dynamical systems are undecidable.
(f) ∴ Branching personal identity is undecidable.
Let us take each premise in turn.
7.1 Branching and chaotic dynamical systems
7.1.1 Branching and n-dimensional dynamical systems
Branching accounts term personal identity, or rather survival, as an event with
n number of outcomes: between two information states of x, x can persist as
x1, x2, ..., xn dependent upon branching. Personal identity must therefore be
33Parfit 1986, 253
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modeled by n-dimensional dynamical systems, because the system has to be
able to keep track of all possible branches.
Take Parfit’s account as a paradigm example. Assume that at some time t, x
splits in two: x1 and x2. At some time t+1, x1 and x2 stand to choose between
two perfumes: {Chanel No. 5, Miss Dior}. Since x1 and x2 are independent
persons they can commit to independent actions, so x1 chooses Chanel No. 5,
and x2 Miss Dior. At this point the branches of x1 and x2 start to diverge. Say,
for example, that y loves Chanel No. 5, but despises Miss Dior. So, x1 and
y live happily together ever after, but x2 remains forever alone. This example
is a proxy for a near infinite and continuous list of choices, so it is reasonable
to conclude that x1 and x2’s respective branches will diverge as their evolution
progresses.
So, the two differing branches must be kept track of by the system model-
ing x ’s survival. Since the probability of every action is weighted by previous
memories, and x1 and x2’s memories diverge, the only option becomes an n-
dimensional dynamical system.
In this way n-dimensional dynamical systems can accommodate Parfit’s ac-
count. By this characterisation branching accounts can serve as inputs to a
Turing machine.
7.1.2 Chaos
However, decidability is dependent on what type of n-dimensional dynamical
system is deployed. I shall argue that only a chaotic system can record personal
identity once it is elevated higher than 1-dimension.
Chaos is a mathematical property of dynamical systems. It entails that the
system is highly sensitive to initial conditions. Had the initial conditions of
the system been slightly different, the evolution of the system would have been
drastically different.
Following Daveney,34 I shall define a system S to be chaotic if it fulfills the
following conditions:
1. Denseness: for each point x1 in S there is a point x2 that is arbitrarily
close.
2. Transitivity : a dense system is automatically transitive because a dense
orbit35 must come arbitrarily close to all points in the system.
3. Sensitivity : if S has sensitive dependence on initial conditions, then we
can always find a point x2 within a distance of x1 whose orbit eventually
differs from that of x by a specified minimal distance ε.
7.1.3 Persons as chaotic dynamical systems
Let us apply chaos to personal identity and dynamical systems by analysing
each chaos condition against branching and non-branching accounts.
34Devaney 1988
35An orbit is a sequence of points.
11
For (1), take the sub-branch for x1. Since this sub-branch is a subset of all
possible branches, there will always be an arbitrarily close correlation between
the relevant set of sub-branches and all possible branches. This satisfies the
density condition for branching accounts. Since non-branching accounts have
no sub-branches, the condition fails to apply.
(2) is an immediate corollary of (1). Transitivity is further ensured in branch-
ing accounts under continuity, which non-branching accounts cannot satisfy.
Finally (3), since it is plausible to argue that any alteration in a person’s
total set of memories (their state (|ψ〉) can cause radical differences for the
evolution of their branch, we can assume the sensitivity condition to hold for
branching accounts. Since non-branching accounts have no sub-branches, there
are no two branches to establish a measurement ε between. So the condition
fails to apply.
This entails that branching personal identity fulfills conditions (1-3), whereas
non-branching does not. Dynamical systems which model branching accounts
must therefore be chaotic, whilst non-branching ones remain monotone.
We can illustrate this with Parfit’s example again. At some time t + 2, x1
and x2 stand to choose between some perfumes: {Chanel No. 5, Miss Dior,
YSL Opium, Prada La Femme}. Since x1’s partner loves Chanel No. 5, x1’s
probability distribution (ρψi) is:
1. Chanel No. 5: 0.91
2. Miss Dior: 0.03
3. YSL Opium: 0.03
4. Prada La Femme: 0.03
Since x2 is single, and still jealous of x1 and y, x2’s probability distribution
(ρψi) is instead:
1. Chanel No. 5: 0.1
2. Miss Dior: 0.1
3. YSL Opium: 0.6
4. Prada La Femme: 0.3
The initial choice at t + 1 is a perturbation ε0 which continues to diverge
x1 and x2’s branches. Every action is weighted by previous memories, so the
timelines of x1 and x2 will diverge exponentially as independent actions accumu-
late. It is therefore evident that ε0 has a drastic effect on x ’s various branches.
The evolution clearly deviates. Considering that ε0 is a proxy which represents
a near infinite list of perturbations: ε1, ε2, ..., εn, it is clear that this dynamic
system is chaotic.
By this I determine premise d fulfilled. Branching personal identity must be
modeled as a chaotic n-dimensional dynamical system.
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7.2 Chaotic n-dimensional dynamical systems are unde-
cidable
Moving to premise e we see that personal identity, as established by premise d, is
undecidable. Chaotic n-dimensional dynamical systems are undecidable because
the relationships between the constants in their states are undecidable. This
problem was initially posed by Penrose36 regarding the Mandelbrot set, and was
subsequently solved by Blum and Smale.37 Arbieto and Matheus38 imported
these results and proved them for chaotic dynamical systems in general. So, if
personal identity is a chaotic n-dimensional dynamical system, then it is not
Turing computable.
In sum, n-dimensional dynamical systems can serve as inputs to Turing
machines. However, glossing personal identity as branching, it is modeled by
a chaotic dynamical system. These systems are undecidable. So branching
personal identity is undecidable, which establishes conclusion f.
Since Parfit’s account has been shown superior in overcoming both transi-
tivity and fission issues, I determine his branching account to more accurately
portray personal identity. From this it follows that personal identity is unde-
cidable.
8 Conclusion
Our best conception of personal identity is branching, and if so, then it is not
computable by deductive Turing machines. I have demonstrated this claim by:
(i) characterising personal identity information theoretically which allows Turing
computation by dynamical systems; (ii) determining that branching personal
identity is superior to non-branching; and finally (iii) showing how branching
accounts are undecidable. The outcome of this conclusion entails that deductive
Turing machines, or any present artificial network, computing the person will
at best achieve an approximation.
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